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A safety-case approach to the ethics of autonomous vehicles 
 
Autonomous Vehicles (AVs) have significant ethical and safety implications. 
Questions of informed consent and risk acceptance are of primary importance, as 
is an explicit identification of the ethical principles underlying these decisions. In 
this paper we present a process framework for producing an ethics assurance 
case, which can be used to translate ethical imperatives into design decisions and 
safety management practices. The process and resultant assurance case integrate 
ethical considerations into the wider engineering lifecycle, providing a tool to 
demonstrate that design and safety management decisions reflect an identified 
ethical position. 
Keywords: safety; ethics; autonomous vehicles; risk 
1. Introduction 
Autonomous Vehicles (AVs) are increasingly being presented as the future of transport 
on public roads. The worth of the Connected and Autonomous Vehicle (CAV) market 
in the UK by 2035 is estimated to be 28bn (Transport Systems Catapult [TSC], 2017), 
and typical estimates for the first occurrence date of fully-autonomous vehicles on UK 
roads are in the mid-2020s (UK Government Department for Transport [DfT], 2015). 
These forecasts confirm the continuing trend towards increased autonomy in this 
domain (Anderson & Anderson, 2007). Real-world trials of AVs are also underway in 
several countries, including the UK (UK Government Centre for Connected and 
Autonomous Vehicles [CCAV], 2018; UK Autodrive, 2017; Venturer, 2016; Venturer, 
2017), the US (Waymo, 2018; Uber, 2018), Singapore, Japan and Europe (CCAV, 
2018). 
Although the technological capability to develop AV systems is developing 
quickly, ethical considerations remain an important societal barrier to their acceptance 




































































in its original form presents an ethical dilemma in which a runaway train is on course to 
kill five people. A bystander is given the choice to let the train continue on its course or 
to divert it onto a different track where only one person will be killed. Although the 
trolley problem is a hypothetical question only, there is mainstream public interest in 
how AVs should behave in similar situations where harm to at least one person is 
inevitable (MIT, 2018).  
It is arguable that the trolley problem has dominated the ethical debate around 
AV introduction to the exclusion of other, more nuanced, ethical considerations 
(Goodall, 2016). These other considerations include the balance and types of risk 
considered acceptable for AVs to present, the distribution of these risks across different 
sections of society (e.g. as differentiated by factors including age, economic position, 
gender) and the different appetites for risk over these same sections (Wang & Zhao, 
2019), concerns over developer culpability and liability (Anderson, Nidhi, Stanley, 
Sorenson & Oluwatola, 2014), the environmental implications of AV introduction 
(Fagnant & Kockelman, 2014) and the impact on transport efficiency. 
In this paper we build on existing work in risk distribution (Menon & 
Alexander, 2017; Menon, Bloomfield & Clements, 2013; Menon & Alexander, 2018) to 
present a process framework for producing an ethics assurance case. This assurance 
case can be used to translate nuanced ethical considerations into safety and design 
requirements, and to demonstrate that identified ethical principles – and the safety 
requirements stemming from these – are satisfied. Structured assurance cases are well 
established in the area of safety argumentation (Bloomfield & Bishop, 2010; Kelly & 
Weaver, 2004; Hawkins, Habli, Kelly & McDermid, 2013) where they are used to 
provide a rigorous justification of the safety of a system. Our proposed approach 




































































framework for explicitly describing ethical principles within the engineering lifecycle. 
The framework ensures that ethical principles are described, justified and implemented 
within the AV design.  
Our framework does not prescribe a set of recommended ethical principles for 
AVs, but rather focuses on the translation of ethical principles into safety requirements. 
As such, the framework is applicable to a range of ethical, risk perception and decision-
making theories, some of which are discussed in Section 2. The framework does assume 
compliance with the UK Human Rights Act (UK Government, 1998) and the other 
national implementations of the European Convention on Human Rights. We restrict 
our discussion throughout this paper on AVs which perform the whole of the driving 
task. These correspond to SAE Level 4 or Level 5, using the levels of automation 
identified and discussed in (SAE International, 2018). 
In Section 2 we present the ethical and safety background relevant to AVs, 
highlighting where existing work does not fully facilitate transformation of ethical 
concerns into safety requirements. Section 3 describes how these ethical concerns 
impact our judgements around risk acceptance and risk balancing. Section 4 describes 
how ethical principles may govern how risks are balanced, or traded off, against each 
other and introduces the concept of risk profiles to describe these trade-offs. Section 5 
presents an ethics assurance case template pattern and a process framework for 
instantiating this template to produce an ethics assurance case, thereby enabling the 
translation of ethical principles into specific safety requirements. Section 6 concludes 




































































2. Ethical and Safety Background Relevant to AVs 
2.1 Ethics and AVs 
While there is currently no regulatory or legislative barrier to the testing and 
deployment of AVs in the UK (DfT, 2015), there are significant ethical and safety 
challenges. AVs have the potential to cause harm in all the ways that traditional cars do 
(e.g. collisions, harmful emissions, impacts on road efficiency), as well as via novel 
pathways. For example, cyber-security is a significant issue (DfT, 2017; UK Autodrive, 
2018) as AVs are vulnerable to being controlled by malicious third parties in a way that 
traditional vehicles are not.  
This potential for AVs to cause harm means that there are significant ethical 
challenges connected with their operation. Public perception of AV safety must be 
considered, alongside the demonstrated safety of such systems and the adequacy of 
mechanisms in place to reduce the risk posed by AVs. Such discussions must also 
consider the selection of risk criteria, the acceptability of residual risk associated with 
the AV and the extent to which users have consented to bear this risk. We note that 
these are also ethical issues for the existing car fleet, in that drivers, pedestrians and 
other road users have not explicitly consented to the risk as currently posed by human 
drivers. It is arguable that a similar ethical argument should be made for the existing 
fleet (as an alternative to the introduction of AVs). Such an argument is beyond the 
scope of this paper, but we note it as a prevailing ethical challenge. 
2.2 Risk Perception Theories 
The study of risk perception and decision making is a wide field, drawing from 
cross-disciplinary domains including psychology, linguistics and engineering. In this 




































































to the societal perception of AVs and their risk acceptability.  
Expected utility theory (von Neumann, 1947) provides a model of risk 
perception which allows for an individual’s risk appetite and risk aversion. These 
properties are crucial when considering the ethics of AV use, as an individual’s 
perception of the novel risks presented by an AV will be affected by their risk appetite. 
As stated earlier, the current (human-driven) fleet also presents risks which have not 
necessarily been explicitly consented to, and the framing of the new AV risks as 
compared to the existing risks can have a significant effect on people’s perception of 
these.  
Both expected utility theory and prospect theory (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979) 
consider the framing of risks, but prospect theory allows for greater complexity around 
risk perception. In particular, it provides a method of addressing the Allais paradox 
(Allais, 1953), and allows us to model risk perceptions around specific AV scenarios 
more accurately. (Wang & Zhao, 2019) use prospect theory to discuss AV risk 
perception in more detail, noting that the demographics which have a higher appetite for 
risk (e.g. young, fully-employed, male, high-income) view new technology more 
favourably, while the risk-averse (poor, elderly) perceive AVs as presenting a risk 
which – when considered in the context of perceived benefits – they are not prepared to 
accept. 
Regret theory (Bell, 1983) provides a model of risk perception and decision making 
which captures the effect of regret, compared to an alternative outcome. Regret theory 
allows for the consideration of regret-avoidance, together with risk aversion and risk 
appetite. (Somasundaram & Diecidue, 2015) use regret theory to consider risk attitudes in 
society, finding that feedback polarizes regret attitudes, and increases risk-seeking amongst 
those who are regret-averse. As before, an increase in risk-seeking can affect the perceived 




































































multiple segments of society, and there is the potential for an increase in risk-seeking by 
one segment to result in a consequently greater risk being posed to another.  
Dual Process Theory (Baron, 1985; Evans, 1989) allows for the interaction between 
decisions made for fast, intuitive reasons and slower decisions based on reasoning. As with 
prospect theory, dual process theory emphasises the importance of attribute framing 
(Cokey, 2009; Reyna, 2004), which is particularly important for AVs given the complexity 
of the risks they present. 
2.2.1 Risk perception of AVs 
Existing work on ethical design standards, such as (IEEE Global, 2018) utilises 
risk perception theories to examine high-level ethical concerns around AVs, as well as 
providing an overview of the societal benefits and concerns around autonomous systems 
in general.  
Other work, such as (UK Autodrive, 2017b), focuses on the different ethical 
factors with the potential to influence the eventual behaviour of an AV. These ethical 
factors can be drawn from the ethical theories discussed above and include the “human 
values”, such as the AV developers’ desire for fairness and the AV passengers’ desire 
for personal autonomy (Thornton, 2018). In practical, engineering terms the first of 
these could lead to developers preferring algorithms which prioritise polite and non-
aggressive behaviour of the AV, while the second could lead to implementation of 
customised AV behaviours which allow passengers to choose the preferred style of 
driving (Kuderer, Gulati & Burgard, 2015). This has ethical implications in itself, in that 
the developers may choose to limit the choices of driving style to those which are non-
aggressive, thereby depriving the passenger of some personal autonomy.  
In addition to these “human values”, there are less altruistic factors which may 




































































competitiveness are likely to be relevant, given the results presented in (UK Autodrive, 
2017b), which identify that potential customers prefer the AV to prioritise the safety of 
its passengers over any third parties. More generally, self-interest could lead to 
developers making choices about the AV behaviour specifically to reduce their 
culpability in the case of an accident (Shalev-Schwartz, Shammah & Shashua, 2017). 
The concerns around how risks are framed is particularly relevant here, and several of 
the relevant ethical theories – including prospect theory and regret theory – identify 
framing as an important factor in willingness to accept a given risk. 
In terms of the behaviours which result from ethical choices, (Gips, 1995; 
Wallach & Allen, 2008) explore how the design of an autonomous system is affected by 
the extent to which ethical reasoning and capacity is embedded within it. (Dennis, 
Fisher, Slavkoviv & Webster, 2004) present formal verification that a high-level ethical 
policy is satisfied by the eventual behaviour of the system. A general architecture for a 
robot capable of modelling its own actions using simulation and predicting the ethical 
consequences of these is discussed in (Winfield, Blum & Liu, 2014; Vanderelst & 
Winfield, 2018) while (Arkin, Ulam & Wagner, 2012) considers simulation of a robot 
with an ethical framework. 
2.2.2 Revisiting the trolley problem 
Much of the on-going public discussion of AV ethics focuses on the trolley problem, 
which posits a situation in which an AV must choose which of two pedestrians with 
which to collide. The trolley problem is often cited in public media as an illustration of 
AV safety issues, and public debate is typically focused around variants of this (MIT, 
2018). However, real-world instances of the trolley problem are rare, and much of the 
public discussion around AVs and the trolley problem assumes a level of engineering 




































































A more realistic variant of the trolley problem considers how the AV can act in 
any given situation to minimise the overall risk (UK Autodrive, 2017b). This requires 
the AV to accurately estimate its own operational capacity and to adjust its behaviour 
accordingly (Nilsson, 2018). Similarly, other work (Lin, 2015) considers the example of 
an AV driving closer (within its lane) to a smaller car on its left than to a truck on its 
right. This choice reduces the risk to the AV, as a collision with a small car is safer for 
the AV occupants than a collision with a truck. Another AV chooses differently, driving 
closer to the heavier vehicle with more effective safety systems (Lin, 2015). This 
second AV is optimising its driving position to reduce the overall risk it poses to other 
road users, as if it collides with the truck this is less likely to result in injuries than a 
collision with the car would be (Gerdes & Thornton, 2016). Other proposed situations 
include an AV choosing a “sacrificial” path, such as placing itself to block the trajectory 
of a runaway vehicle (Lin, 2015). 
3. Translating ethics into design 
Considered as a body, the works presented in Section 2 provide two important 
foundational results: how to specify AV behaviours in individual scenarios, and how to 
assess AV behaviours resulting from given ethical principles. However, they do not 
provide a general mechanism for specifying the ethical principles, documenting the 
translation of these into AV behaviours, or justifying that ethically-motivated 
behaviours are demonstrated and will continue to be so.  
Formal verification, as shown in (Dennis et. al., 2004; Winfield et. al., 2014; 
Vanderelst & Winfield, 2018), is a valuable contribution in this area. However, formal 
verification of the entirety of a complex safety critical system – such as an AV – has 
historically been considered infeasible due to cost, technical limitations, and perceived 




































































Moreover, such verification is also intended to demonstrate correctness according to the 
specification only, and therefore does not consider wider issues of overall risk 
reduction, regulatory compliance or errors due to inadequate requirements elicitation 
and environmental changes. Consideration of these issues is a legal requirement for 
safety-critical systems (Health and Safety Executive [HSE], 2001).  
In the more nuanced trolley problems discussed in Section 2.2.2, the behaviour 
of the AV is motivated by the intent to reduce risk, whether this be to its own occupants 
or to other drivers on the road. Such a motivation, of course, is more properly ascribed 
to the AV developers rather than to the AV itself. This distinction highlights two 
interrelated areas of application when considering the ethics of AVs: implemented ethics 
(the ethics embedded within an autonomous system and realised in its behaviour) and 
engineering ethics (the ethical principles and codes of practice followed by engineers). 
Making this distinction allows us to interrogate the ethical behaviour of the AV without 
necessarily considering the professional conduct of the developers, and vice versa. 
3.1 Engineering ethics and implemented ethics 
Engineering ethics refers to the professional ethical principles which are followed by 
the developers of the AV during development work. These principles may be 
represented by professional codes of conduct (Royal Academy of Engineering 
[RAEng], 2017) as well as more general informal undertakings (Martin & Schinzinger, 
2005). 
Such ethical principles typically include criteria such as honesty, integrity, 
respect for law and the public interest, accuracy, rigour, fairness and objectivity 
(RAEng, 2017). However, they do not in themselves constrain the behaviour of any 
resulting system on ethical lines. It is, however, plausible that following a code of 




































































that contravenes established ethical foundations (e.g. the Human Rights Act (UK 
Government, 1998)). 
Implemented ethics refers to the ethics embedded in the behaviour of the AV 
itself, sometimes referred to as the “moral algorithm” (UK Autodrive, 2017b) or the 
“machine ethics” of the AV. The implemented ethics determine how multiple risks are 
balanced against each other, and how safety risk is balanced against considerations of 
security, privacy, trust and capability. Different societies and stakeholders will differ in 
their criteria for what behaviour is considered ethically acceptable, and this will also 
vary across environments and domains of use. 
3.2 AVs and risk reduction 
Arguments have been put forward (Kalra & Groves, 2017) that AVs should be 
introduced as soon as their safety record is slightly better than traditional vehicles. Such 
studies estimate 500,000 fewer overall road fatalities over a fifty-year time frame 
compared to a conservative policy of AV introduction. 
However, looking only at overall road fatalities obscures the distribution of such 
fatalities, which is crucial from both an ethical and safety perspective. The introduction 
of AVs may transfer risks even while reducing overall risk. That is, AVs may change 
how different classes of people (e.g. human drivers, passengers, pedestrians) are 
differentially exposed to risks. Any risk transfer also raises the question of risk consent, 
and whether all affected parties have agreed to the redistribution of risk. (As we 
discussed earlier, such explicit consent has not in fact been sought for the current fleet. 
People’s decision to accept or reject the current fleet risk is largely intuitive, 
corresponding to many of the factors discussed in Section 2.2. The current method of 




































































mitigation given a particular accident scenario appeals to legal processes rather than 
ethics). 
A complicating factor here is that informed consent requires an accurate 
perception of the risk posed by the AV. The decision-making theories of Section 2.2 
identify a number of different motivating factors for decision-making under risk, but 
most compelling for AVs is that the perception of risk posed by the AV vs that posed by 
a human (driver) is not uniform across society (Kim & McGill, 2011; Wang & Zhao, 
2019). A Singaporean study (Wang & Zhao, 2019) has shown that those who are more 
likely to benefit from AVs (high-income, urban-dwelling) are more willing to accept the 
risks, while a more general study of autonomous systems (Kim & McGill, 2011) shows 
that low-income segments of society are more likely to trust machines rather than 
interrogate the engineering and ethical principles behind these.  
Another complicating factor is the potential for AVs to contribute to risk 
indirectly, as participants in the wider road network. For example, AVs which mis-
identify emergency vehicles may not pull over for these vehicles, thereby indirectly 
causing harm. Similarly, AVs which learn to behave selfishly (e.g. failing to give way, 
aggressive driving) may also cause traffic congestion across the wider road network  
The introduction of AVs which perform the majority of the driving task also 
transfers ownership of much of the risk associated with this task. Currently the driver 
owns much of this risk, system failure notwithstanding. However, for AVs at SAE 
levels 4 and 5, it is possible that the developer will own nearly the entire risk associated 
with the minute-by-minute driving decisions within the operational design domain. 
Although the human passenger may still provide input into route choices, customisation 
of driving techniques and overall usage, this would mean that AVs would be associated 




































































manufacturer and developer – not personally exposed to the possible outcomes of the 
resultant risks. 
4 Ethics and risk balancing 
As discussed in Section 3.2, one of the fundamental issues around ethics and safety of 
AVs is the question of risk transfer, or risk balancing. It is the redistribution of risks 
consequent on introduction of AVs which throws up the most complex ethical 
challenges.  
There is a legal requirement in the UK for the overall risk associated with a 
system to be reduced As Low As Reasonably Practicable (ALARP). The Health and 
Safety Executive provides guidance (HSE, 2001) for good practice in reducing risk 
ALARP and for demonstrating this.  
For a minority of systems, the system risk can be reduced ALARP by mitigating 
the risk from each individual hazard until it is ALARP. However, in cases where risk 
has been transferred and redistributed (as with AVs), the situation is more complex. It is 
possible to reduce a single risk at the cost of introducing another, or introduce a risk 
mitigation which affects multiple risks at once. This means that it is possible for 
multiple different system designs to all be ALARP, but for each to provide a different 
balance amongst the individual system risks (Menon et. al., 2013). This can occur under 
the following circumstances: 
 When developers have not identified a complete list of hazards. This is relatively 
likely during the initial deployment of AVs, as safety engineers will not have 
complete and valid tools for identifying and understanding hazards due to the 




































































 When there are interdependencies between hazards which are not adequately 
accounted for. In these situations, some risks may be accounted for twice, giving 
a false idea of the overall risk associated with the system. There may also be 
interdependencies between systems and common mode failures which increase 
the complexity of combining risks. Given the relative novelty of AV technology 
and risk management, this is likely to be a significant issue. 
 When multiple risk mitigations are not independent, and a mitigation for one 
risk potentially increases other risks. For example, increasing the sensitivity of 
algorithms which detect an object mitigates against the risk of failure to detect, 
but increases the risk of erratic driving (the AV may brake unnecessarily to 
avoid a “phantom” object) and therefore the likelihood of a collision. 
 When a single risk mitigation affects multiple hazards. In this case, the cost of 
the mitigation can be amortized over all the hazards and the resulting cost 
judged reasonably practicable, where it would not when assessed against each 
hazard individually. 
 There are limited resources subject to a threshold effect of aggregation. For 
example, in a SAE level 3 vehicle (i.e. one with supervising driver), operator 
attention may be a mitigation against several hazards. When these hazards 
present themselves simultaneously, the operator may be overwhelmed. 
In circumstances where multiple different designs all present an overall ALARP system 
risk, selecting any one of these designs represents a risk distribution choice. That is, 
each design provides a different balance amongst the individual system risks, “trading 
off” an increase in one risk for a decrease in another. This is an established practice in 
the nuclear domain, with standards such as (HSE, 2006; Office for Nuclear Regulation 




































































However, outside the nuclear domain many safety guidance documents provide little 
information on risk balancing and risk transfer, or require an explicit justification of any 
risk trade-offs. 
4.1 Ethical motivation for risk balancing 
Where multiple different system designs all offer an overall ALARP risk, the final 
choice may be affected by a number of factors including cost, technical capability, 
resource availability and ethical imperatives. The cheapest design may be chosen, or the 
design which can be most easily implemented with the resources and technology at 
hand. In these cases the justification is relatively simple and has long been part of 
standard project management techniques (Office of Government Commerce, 2019).  
However, the ethical principles behind selecting a design are not generally 
explicitly discussed. Historically, there has been no mechanism to record those ethical 
imperatives which result in developers considering one risk to be more important than 
another. AVs in particular are vulnerable to the impact of such “hidden” ethical 
priorities of the designers. This is exemplified in the trolley problem, in its simplified 
form. The AV designer will use his / her ethical principles to decide whether the AV – 
guided by its programming – should impact one person or the other. Each of these 
choices will result in different system designs (because of the difference in behaviour), 
which present different risks to different people. However, the same overall system risk 
will remain the same whichever person is impacted.  
Because the ethical complexities around AV operation and use have the 
potential to result in different distributions of risk, we consider that there is an 
obligation to provide information to the general public about the ethically-motivated 
risk trade-offs that have made during development. Furthermore, where ethical 




































































another equivalent risk not acceptable) and to have acted on this to inform the system 
design, this practice must be communicated to the general public. For example, where a 
developer has chosen a system design for the AV which prioritises the safety of 
passengers over pedestrians, this decision should be made explicit to both pedestrians 
and passengers. Visibility of this information is necessary if affected stakeholders are to 
provide informed consent to the risks that they bear as a result. Such visibility is, of 
course, lacking in the current fleet (pedestrians are unaware of the degree of self-interest 
of drivers), with current decisions around risk acceptance being made according to 
intuitive or personal ethical theories where in many cases insufficient information is 
provided for a full understanding. 
4.2 Refinement of risk factors 
When deciding which of two equivalent risks is preferable, or when performing 
risk trade-offs, the AV developer must consider more than the magnitude of the risks. 
There are other factors which may make one risk preferable (to the developer) than 
another risk of equivalent magnitude, in terms of safety. It is important to note that this 
does not mean that the same risk would necessarily be also judged preferable by an AV 
user, by a pedestrian or even by another AV developer. Risk perception varies between 
individuals and between segments of society, and is informed by risk appetite and 
underlying ethical principles. 
 Risk is typically calculated to be dependent on both the outcome and the 
likelihood of this outcome 
Risk = harm * likelihood 
If an AV developer wants to differentiate between two risks which may be of 
equivalent magnitude, and further to trade one of these risks off against another, it is 




































































must be able to provide sufficient information to justify why these risks are different, 
and to demonstrate how his or her underlying ethical imperatives have informed trade-
offs between different risks.  
With this in mind, we propose the following factors that characterise risks 
beyond their magnitude (severity x likelihood). We treat the factors below differently to 
how we treat severity and likelihood, in that we do not impose a ranking on them, or 
hold an implicit brief that some values of these factors are “worse” than others in terms 
of ethics. The factors are informational only, and serve to differentiate one risk from 
another of equivalent magnitude. These factors are: 
a) The exposed population 
We propose identifying several broad categories for the population who might 
be exposed to any given risk. These will vary depending on the risk in question. For 
example, the population exposed to the risk of collision includes the AV passengers and 
other nearby road users, while the population exposed to the risk of emissions includes 
pedestrians and those living in nearby houses. Categories of stakeholders should include 
(not all will be relevant for all risks):  
 The AV passenger 
 Other road users (e.g. other drivers, motorcyclists etc.) 
 Pedestrians and cyclists 
 Those living near the road 
  b)  Effective risk horizon 
This refers to the physical and temporal area in which the harm from a given risk 
is experienced. In physical terms, the harm may manifest close to the AV or further 




































































later. We emphasise that a change in effective risk horizon does not necessarily affect 
the magnitude of the risk: that is, a “close” risk is not necessarily worse than a “distant” 
risk. Nevertheless, an AV developer may look to differentiate two equivalent risks by 
their effective risk horizons. Different risk horizons may cause the quality of the risks to 
be perceived differently, and may affect the way in which their associated economic, 
reputational or emotional effect is viewed. These will all have implications for the 
ethical imperatives of the AV developer. Some examples of risks which differ in terms 
of effective risk horizon (as well as potentially in magnitude) are: 
 A risk of collision can result in geographically local harm (a collision outcome 
harms pedestrians only in the immediate area) 
 A risk of the AV causing road congestion can result in geographically wider 
harm (the traffic jam delays an ambulance several streets away, causing harm to 
the patient) 
 A risk of collision can result in harm that is close in time (the harmful effects of 
a crash are typically experienced immediately) 
 A risk of cancer from carcinogenic AV fuel can result in harm which is distant 
in time (cancer may take years to develop) 
c) Causes 
Risk cause is also relevant to AV developers seeking to differentiate between 
equivalent risks. Although, as with the above factors, the cause of a risk does not 
necessarily affect the magnitude of that risk, there may be ethical, emotional and 
intuitive reasons why an AV developer might prioritise the mitigation of risks from 




































































consideration in some risk decisions; a developer may choose to reduce risks from a 
cause which is also likely to engender regret. 
4.2.1 Risk profiles and risk balancing 
Previous work (Menon et. al., 2013) introduces the concept of risk profiles, each of 
which represents an approach to balancing and trading off risks. The risk profiles 
defined in previous work focus primarily on the magnitude of risk, and the justification 
for accepting an increase in one risk in return for a decrease in another. Two 
fundamental risk profiles examined in (Menon et. al., 2013) are the fairness in 
improvement profile (where an attempt is made to reduce all risks by the same 
magnitude) and the fairness in outcome profile (where an attempt is made to reduce all 
risks to the same magnitude). The authors also identify a number of confounding factors 
which can limit the practical application of these risk profiles, including the challenge 
of fully characterising two equivalent – but different – risks of the same magnitude.  
The risk refinement factors identified above represent an approach that can be 
developed to address this challenge. Characterising a risk by its exposed population, 
effective risk horizon and cause allows more complex ethical arguments to be made 
about risk prioritisation and permits, for example, the ethical arguments that might be 
used in accepting a brief short-term increase in risk for a longer-term decrease in risk. 
Constructing representative risk profiles from the risk refinement factors is 
beyond the current scope of this paper, and hence we restrict ourselves to noting the 
utility of such risk profiles in explicitly identifying and justifying the ethical imperatives 
behind risk trade-offs.  
5. A process framework and ethics assurance case pattern 




































































principles into specific safety / design requirements, and also provides a tool for 
demonstrating the satisfaction of these requirements. The framework is in two parts: an 
ethics assurance case template pattern and a process framework for instantiating this 
template to produce an ethics assurance case. The process for instantiating the ethics 
assurance case template pattern uses the risk balancing and trade-offs (risk profiles) of 
Section 4, and must be embedded within a wider engineering lifecycle. 
We first provide some background on structured assurance cases, and their 
history of use. We then build on this to define the template pattern and the process 
framework, including a diagram and textual discussion of each.  
5.1 Structured assurance cases 
Within safety engineering, structured assurance cases are used to present a compelling, 
credible argument that a system is safe in a given context (Bloomfield & Bishop, 2010;  
Kelly & Weaver, 2004; Kelly, 2007; Object Management Group [OMG], 2019). An 
assurance case consists of a set of claims about the system, such as a claim that all 
hazards have been identified, or that the failure rate of the system is below a certain 
threshold. These claims are supported with evidence, and with an argument that the 
evidence is sufficient to provide confidence in that claim. Claims can be broken down 
into sub-claims, and typically several pieces of evidence are needed to provide 
confidence that a claim has been satisfied. 
Assurance cases allow safety management decisions to be scrutinized (e.g. by a 
regulator) and defended. The adequacy of the argument is critical, and assurance cases 
typically build on a set of principles which must be satisfied within the overall argument 
construction. These principles define an assurance case template pattern, which is a 




































































introducing a logical, technical or semantic error. An assurance case template pattern 
therefore consists of a template argument built upon these principles. In practice, the 
template argument might contain a number of claims in order to support each principle, 
and each claim might also support multiple principles. 
For example, safety standards within the defence domain (UK Ministry of 
Defence [MOD], 2017) require that arguments in assurance cases demonstrate 
satisfaction of the following four principles. Consequently, argument template patterns 
for assurance cases to be used in the defence environment typically contain claim(s) 
corresponding to each principle: 
1. Safety requirements are defined to address the system’s contribution to hazards 
2. The intent of the safety requirements shall be maintained throughout 
requirements decomposition 
3. The safety requirements shall be satisfied 
4. Hazardous behaviour of the system shall be identified and mitigated 
Argument template patterns must be instantiated for use with a particular 
system. It is at this stage that specific requirements, specifications, V&V artefacts and 
other items of evidence are included to expand and support the claims. 
A significant body of work already exists around the construction and 
instantiation of assurance case template patterns, with common questions being focused 
on how to create template patterns which eliminate logical fallacies, unjustified 
assumptions, weakened conclusions or other similar faults (Bloomfield & Bishop, 2010; 
Kelly, 2007; Hawkins, Habli, Kolovos, Paige & Kelly, 2015; Common Criteria, 2007). 
5.2. Principles for ethics assurance case template pattern 




































































principles for assurance cases in the defence domain (MOD, 2017). We define four 
extended principles for the ethics domain as follows: 
P1. Ethics requirements appropriate for AV development and operation shall 
be defined. 
This requires that engineering ethics and implemented ethics 
requirements should be explicitly defined, free from inconsistencies, and 
containing sufficient detail to allow the other principles to be met.  
P2. The intent of the ethics requirements shall be maintained throughout 
decomposition. 
This requires that the implemented ethics should be propagated 
throughout the design of the system and refined into lower-level 
requirements on design, implementation and risk management. The 
engineering ethics should be satisfied throughout the system lifecycle. 
P3. Ethics requirements shall be satisfied. 
This requires that the ethics requirements, both implemented and 
engineering, should be demonstrably satisfied and evidence provided to 
support this. 
P4. The AV shall continue to be safe, and emergent behaviour of the AV which 
conflicts with the ethics requirements shall be identified and mitigated 
This constrains emergent behaviour of the AV, either due to changes in 
the environment or to adaptive algorithms used within the AV software. 




































































specifying the original ethics and safety requirements, and this principle 
requires that evidence be provided to assure the continued safety of the 
AV even in a changing environment. 
There is a further principle relating to confidence in (MOD, 2015), which has no 
immediate analogue to ethics, and which we do not develop further.  
5.3. Process and assurance case framework 
5.3.1 Ethics assurance case template 
Figure 1 shows the ethics assurance case template pattern using Goal Structuring 





































































Figure 1: ethical assurance template argument pattern 
 
Claim A1: Engineering ethics are adequately defined, implemented and adhered to 
during the system lifecycle 
This claim partially supports P3 and requires AV developers to demonstrate compliance 
with an appropriate code of conduct, domain-specific good practice and existing ethical 
precedents. This claim might reasonably be supported with records from audits and 




































































followed processes defined in accordance with codes of professional conduct. This 
claim helps to provide confidence in the integrity of any lifecycle artefacts which are 
needed to support the top-level claim of Figure 1. 
Claim B1: Implemented ethics compliant with the environment of use are adequately 
specified. 
This claim supports P1, and is broken down into two sub-claims as follows: 
Claim B1.1: The implemented ethics are adequately specified 
Specification of the implemented ethics may be achieved via identification and citation 
of relevant items of regulation and policy, as well as the results of any public 
consultation or ethical objections already tabled. It may also be useful to specify aspects 
of implemented ethics via references to previous system designs, to academic papers, 
and to accepted good practice. The specification of the implemented ethics must be 
sufficient to address competing ethical motivations, and its adequacy must be explicitly 
justified. 
Claim B1.2: The implemented ethics comply with the legal, social and ethical norms of 
the environment of use 
The implemented ethics must be compatible with behaviour that would be reasonably 
expected by the general public for an AV operating within the stated environment. It 
should be noted that this does not necessarily imply an AV should behave in exactly the 
same way as a human driver (IEEE Global, 2018), but rather that the AV should act in a 
way that a human might plausibly expect from an AV. 
Claim C1: The intent of the implemented ethics shall be maintained throughout 




































































This claim supports P2, and serves to translate ethical requirements into lower-level 
safety and risk management requirements which implement the ethical intent. It is 
broken down into two sub-claims as follows: 
Claim C1.1: The risk balancing and trade-offs resulting from the implemented ethics 
across different environments have been specified in the form of a risk profile 
The risk profiles discussed in Section 4 provide a method of reflecting ethical 
perspectives in risk management, risk balancing and risk distribution decisions. 
Satisfaction of this claim requires provision of an explicit description of the risk trade-
offs and balances that have been performed, in the form of a risk profile.  
Claim C1.2: The design of the AV reflects the risk profile 
This claim is supported by an argument that the risk balancing inherent in the specified 
risk profile has been performed accordingly, via the translation of this risk profile into 
technical, safety and risk requirements. It is broken down into three further sub-claims 
as follows: 
Claim C1.2.1: The risk profile has been decomposed into requirements on the design 
and functionality of the system 
This claim is supported by referencing out to the design and implementation 
requirements specification, as well as to the safety case. 
Claim C1.2.2: The design and functional requirements of the system are satisfied. 
This claim is supported by referencing evidence provided within the safety case, which 
is the primary mechanism for demonstrating satisfaction of design and safety 
requirements. 
Claim D1: The implemented ethics requirements are satisfied. 
This claim partially supports P3 and requires identification of what the acceptable 




































































requirements will help support this claim, as will a description of the functionality and 
behaviours which comply with these ethics. Supplementary supporting evidence will 
include system verification and validation of the derived requirements sourced from the 
ethical imperatives via risk profiles. Traceability between these derived requirements 
and any further lower-level requirements must be demonstrated, along with traceability 
between these derived requirements and verification artefacts.  
Claim E1: Any conflicts between emergent behaviour of the AV and the implemented 
ethics are identified and mitigated so far as is reasonably practicable. 
This claim supports P4 and requires an estimation of likely emergent behaviours and 
changes in the environment throughout the AV’s lifetime. Support for this claim 
requires a gap analysis of potential environmental change, as well as of gap analysis 
between the behaviours which may potentially be learnt by AVs (via adaptive 
algorithms and continuous machine learning) and the behaviours which were “hard-
coded” or scripted at deployment. Any conflicts between the ethics requirements and 
these new behaviours and environments must be identified and mitigated so far as is 
reasonably practicable. 
5.3.1 Engineering-focused process 
In order to be applicable to a given system, the ethics assurance case template 
that we describe above must be instantiated for that system. This is achieved via the 
second part of our framework: an engineering-focused process that uses the risk profiles 
of Section 4 to makes risk trade-offs and risk balances explicit. This process sits within 
the wider engineering lifecycle, and relies on artefacts from that lifecycle, such as test 
results, requirements specifications etc.  
The process consists of several phases, as shown in Figure 2, with decision points and 




































































of Figure 2 relate only to the instantiation of the ethics assurance template. 
Consequently, Figure 2 deliberately excludes decision points and feedback loops which 
relate to the wider engineering lifecycle, such as feedback loops to indicate iteration 
over engineering requirements, or decision points to verify that such requirements are 
fulfilled. This ensures that instantiation of the ethics assurance template does not depend 
on a specific engineering lifecycle process being used.  
 
Figure 2: engineering-focused process 
Phase 1: identify and interrogate engineering ethics 
This phase instantiates Claim A1 of Figure 1, and consists of activities to identify and 
interrogate the engineering ethics of the developers. These ethical principles and codes 
of conduct are crucial to maintain the integrity of the AV development for stakeholders 









































































importance of the developers’ engineering ethics, concerns at this point may result in a 
hard stop for the project via decision point α.  
Phase 2: Identify ethical norms of AV use 
This phase partially instantiates Claim B1 of Figure 1 and consists of activities to 
identify the legal, social and ethical norms of the proposed AV use. These norms will be 
situation-dependent (an AV operating on a motorway will be subject to different norms 
than an AV operating near a school). As discussed earlier, this phase is not about 
determining how human drivers act in a given environment, but rather about 
determining how humans will expect the prospective AV to act in its environment of 
use situation.  
Phase 3: Ethics requirements gathering 
This phase instantiates Claim C2, and also completes the instantiation of Claim B1. It is 
a tri-part phase which also serves as an interaction and feed-in point for the 
requirements phase of the wider engineering lifecycle. During this phase the developers 
identify the implemented ethics (i.e. the ethics that will govern the behaviour of the 
AV), negotiate risk profiles which reflect those ethics and their associated risk trade-
offs, and decompose these risk profiles into design and safety requirements. (There will 
of course, be additional requirements gathering activities defined within the engineering 
lifecycle, but these are excluded from the scope of Figure 2). Should the implemented 
ethics not match the norms of AV use in the proposed environment, this phase is 
iterated over again, as shown via the decision point β and its associated feedback loop in 
Figure 2. We note that in practice that gathering and refinement of ethics requirements 
is likely to be an ongoing process, occurring simultaneously with implementation of 
ethics requirements and verification and validation of ethics requirements. This iteration 




































































Phase 4: Implementation of ethics requirements 
This phase serves as an interaction and feed-in point for the system development and 
implementation phase(s) of the wider engineering lifecycle. This phase incorporates 
development and implementation against the ethics requirements of the AV 
specification. There is no specific output from this phase in terms of instantiation of the 
ethics assurance case template.  
Phase 5: Ethics verification & validation 
This phase instantiates Claim D1 of Figure 1. It also serves as an interaction and feed-in 
point for the verification and validation performed during the wider engineering 
lifecycle. This phase incorporates verification and validation of the implemented AV 
system against its ethical requirements. Should this V&V identify that the ethical 
requirements have not been met (via decision point δ), there will be a return to Phase 3 
to iterate over the gathering, refinement and subsequent implementation of these ethical 
requirements.  
Phase 6: Monitor emergent behaviour 
This phase instantiates Claim E1 of Figure 1, and consists of activities to monitor any 
behaviour of the AV which emerges after its deployment. Emergent behaviour may be 
due to the use of continuous machine learning, which requires the AV to adapt and 
refine its behaviours in response to new input. Similarly, emergent behaviour may be 
due to an original under-specification of behaviours, or over-restrictive assumptions 
about the environment in which the AV may eventually need to operate. Where any 
emergent behaviour is identified, a further assessment activity must be made to 
determine whether this behaviour complies with the ethical requirements of the AV. 
Because such emergent behaviour may relate to a new or unforeseen use of the AV, or 




































































Phase 2 (via decision point ε) in order to iterate and expand upon the norms of AV use 
for this new environment. 
Phase 7: decommission and withdrawal 
This phase corresponds to the end-of-life point for an AV system. End-of-life decisions 
may be taken where the system is superseded by another, or where legal, ethical, 
technological or societal factors lead to a situation where withdrawal of the system is 
recommended. There is no specific output from this phase in terms of instantiation of 
the ethics assurance case template. 
6 Conclusions 
In this paper, we have discussed the ethical concerns around the introduction and use of 
AVs, focusing on the perceived risk these present, and the acceptability of this risk. We 
have identified a number of factors which affect risk perception and risk acceptance, 
particularly where ethical principles such as altruism or “fairness” are concerned.  
One of the most significant underlying ethical issues we have discussed is the 
situation where different risks are balanced against each other, with an increase in one 
risk being traded off against a decrease in another. This is of particular concern to AVs 
where risk is transferred between different segments of society (e.g. from the AV 
passenger to pedestrians or other road users). At present it is not always clear when such 
risk trade-offs have been made by developers, or what the ethical factors motivating 
these are. We argue that this lack of clarity can lead to a lack of informed societal 
consent to these risks. 
In order to increase transparency of the ethical factors which drive such risk 
decisions, we have identified a methodology for explicitly translating the underlying 
ethics of AV behaviour into safety and design requirements on the AV. This 




































































engineering-focused process for instantiating this template. Together, these ensure that 
the underlying ethical and risk-balancing choices of the AV developers are identified 
and explicitly justified. This is achieved via the use of risk profiles, which require 
developers to describe the approach to risk reduction that they have taken, and to justify 
their risk transfer decisions.  
The framework we propose is also applicable to fully-autonomous systems in 
other domains with ethical concerns, such as the military and healthcare fields. We 
propose to expand this work in future to apply this methodology to a working case 
study, either in the automotive, military or healthcare domains. A foundational step in 
this will be to build a taxonomy of risk profiles in conjunction with industry personnel. 
This will allow us to represent the risk transfer decisions which are made in a real-world 
scenario. 
We also propose to extend the framework to address the issue of confidence. 
Like safety, ethics is a limit concept (Kelly, Habli, Nicholson, Megone & Mcnish, 
2014) and the degree of confidence stakeholders have in the ethics of a system will be 
dependent on the evidence they have been shown. We propose further study into the 
societal perception of AVs in order to identify what factors increase confidence in the 
ethical principles governing the AV, and what steps can be taken to mitigate a lack of 
confidence. As part of this work we will also consider ways to formalise certain ethical 
principles relevant to AV introduction and operation, including the principle of double 
effect and Kantian ethics, along the lines of (Bentzen, 2015; Linder & Bentzen, 2018).  
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